In a recent article in on "Bayes' Theorem in the 21st Century", Science Bradley Efron uses Bayes' theorem to calculate the probability that twins are identical given that the sonogram shows twin boys. He concludes that Bayesian calculations cannot be uncritically accepted when using uninformative priors. We argue that this conclusion is problematic because Efron's example on identical twins does not use data, hence it is not Bayesian statistics; his priors are not appropriate and are not uninformative; and using the available data point and an uninformative prior actually leads to a reasonable posterior distribution.
2 ) https://doi.org/10.12688/f1000research. 2-278.v1 29 Jul 2015, :278 ( Latest published:
2 ) https://doi.org/10.12688/f1000research. 2-278.v2 v1 Correspondence Efron 1 provides four examples of Bayesian analyses, two of which underline the remarkable potential of Bayesian methods. Based on one of the other examples, however, Efron ultimately concludes that Bayesian analyses using uninformative priors cannot be uncritically accepted and should be checked by frequentist methods. While we wholeheartedly agree that statistical results should not be uncritically accepted, we find Efron's example ineffective in showing that Bayesian statistics require more careful checking than any other kind of statistics.
In his example on uninformative priors, Efron uses Bayes' theorem to calculate the probability that twins are identical given that the sonogram shows twin boys. Efron finds this probability to be 2/3 when using an uninformative prior versus 1/2 with an informative prior and thereby concludes that an uninformative prior does not have the desired neutral effects on the output of Bayes' rule. We argue that this example is not only flawed, but useless in illustrating Bayesian data analysis because it does not rely on any data. Although there is one data point (a couple is due to be parents of twin boys, and the twins are fraternal), Efron does not use it to update prior knowledge. Instead, Efron combines different pieces of expert knowledge from the doctor and genetics using Bayes' theorem. While certainly an impeccable probability law, Bayes' theorem is a mathematical equation, not a statistical model describing how data may be produced. In essence, Efron uses this equation to show that the value on the left side of the equation changes when a term on the right side is changed, which is trivial and could be shown with any mathematical equation also in a non-Bayesian context. Without new data, our knowledge is by definition determined by prior information; thus, showing that the outcome of a Bayesian analysis with no new data is heavily influenced by the prior would not argue against Bayesian methods. Indeed, without data, Efron's example is not Bayesian statistics and his conclusion about Bayesian statistics based on this example is unjustified.
We also have other more technical issues with Efron's example. Efron interprets the term P(A) on the right side of the equation (see sidebar in Efron 2013a 1 ) as the prior on the probability that twins are identical. To make this prior uninformative, it is assigned a value of P(A) = 0.5 (see Efron 2013b 2 ; although this is not stated in Efron 2013a 1 ). This uninformative prior is set in contrast to the informative "doctor's prior" of P(A) = 1/3. First, however, the parameter of interest is P(A|B) rather than P(A) according to Efron's study question (see sidebar in Efron 2013a 1 ), thus the focus should be on the appropriate prior for P(A|B). Second, for the uninformative prior, Efron mentions erroneously that he used a uniform distribution between zero and one, which is clearly different from the value of 0.5 that was used. Third, we find it at least debatable whether a prior can be called an uninformative prior if it has a fixed value of 0.5 given without any measurement of uncertainty. For example, if we knew that our chance of winning the next million-dollar jackpot were 50:50, would we really call this uninformative?
If we use the data point together with an uninformative uniform prior on P(A|B) to determine the probability of identical twins given the twins are two boys (see Box 1), we obtain, with 95% certainty, a probability of between 0.01 and 0.84; if we use a highly informative prior based on information from the doctor and genetics, we obtain a probability of between 0.49 and 0.51. This looks completely reasonable to us, although of course we do not know much more than we knew before because we had only a single data point.
We would very much like to check our calculations using frequentist methods; however, this is impossible because there is only one data point, and frequentist methods generally cannot handle such situations. Although we agree with Efron 1 that the choice of the prior is essential, we conclude that his article gives a biased impression of the influence of uninformative priors. In his example using Bayes' theorem, we found no reliable support for his main conclusion that Bayesian calculations cannot be uncritically accepted when using uninformative priors.
Box 1. Study question: What is the probability of identical twins given the twins are two boys?
Data: One pair of twin boys is fraternal.
Data model: x~Binomial(θ, n), where θ is the probability of identical twins given the twins are two boys, x is the number of identical twins in the data, and n is the total number of pairs of twin boys; in our case: x = 0 and n = 1.
The posterior distribution p(θ|x) is obtained using Bayes' theorem p(θ|x) = p(x|θ)p(θ)/p(x)
We use two different priors p(θ): 1) Uninformative prior: p(θ) = Unif(0,1) = Beta(1,1).
2) Informative prior: using the information from the doctor and from genetics, we are quite sure that θ must be around 0.5 1 . Transforming this information into a statistical distribution yields p(θ) = Beta(10000, 10000), which has a mean of 0.5 and a 95% interval of 0.49307 -0.50693. [Note that we had to choose the 95% interval arbitrarily because we are not informed about the certainty of the information provided by the doctor and by genetics].
Given the single parameter Binomial model, x~Binomial(θ, n), and the prior p(θ) = Beta(α,β), the solution of the Bayesian analysis is given by the posterior distribution p(θ|x) = Beta(α+x,β+n-x) [see any Bayesian textbook, e.g. Gelman et al. 2004 3 , p. 34 ].
The probability of identical twins given the twins are two boys: 1) Uninformative prior: p(θ|x) = Beta(1+x,1+n-x) = Beta(1+0,1+1-0) = Beta (1, 2) , which has an expected value of 0.33 and a 95% interval of 0.013 -0.84.
2) Informative prior: p(θ|x) = Beta(10000+x,10000+n-x) = Beta(10000+0,10000+1-0) = Beta(10000, 10001), which has an expected value of 0.49998 and a 95% interval of 0.49305 -0.50690.
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Efron (2013b) concerns a woman who is carrying twins, both male (as determined by sonogram and we ignore the possibility that gender has been observed incorrectly). The parents-to-be ask Efron to tell them the probability that the twins are identical. This is my first open review, so I'm not sure of the protocol. But given that there appears to be errors in both and the paper under review, I am sorry to say that my review might actually be longer Efron (2013b) than the article by , the primary focus of the critique, and the critique itself. I apologize in Efron (2013a) advance for this. To start, I will outline the problem being discussed for the sake of readers.
This problem has various parameters of interest. The primary parameter is the genetic composition of the twins in the mother's womb. Are they identical (which I describe as the state = 1) or fraternal twins ( = x x 0)? Let be the data, with = 1 to indicate the twins are the same gender. Finally, we wish to obtain Pr( y y x = 1 | = 1), the probability the twins are identical given they are the same gender . Bayes' rule gives us an y expression for this:
Now we know that Pr( = 1 | = 1) = 1; twins must be the same gender if they are identical. Further, Pr( = y x y 1 | = 0) = 1/2; if twins are not identical, the probability of them being the same gender is 1/2.
x Finally, Pr( = 1) is the prior probability that the twins are identical. The bone of contention in the Efron x papers and the critique by Amrhein revolves around how this prior is treated. One can think of Pr( = et al.
x 1) as the population-level proportion of twins that are identical for a mother like the one being considered.
However, if we ignore other forms of twins that are extremely rare (equivalent to ignoring coins finishing on their edges when flipping them), one incontrovertible fact is that Pr( = 0) = 1 − Pr( = 1); the probability x x that the twins are fraternal is the complement of the probability that they are identical. 1 The above values and expressions for Pr( = 1 | = 1), Pr( = 1 | = 0), and Pr( = 0) leads to a simpler y x y x x expression for the probability that we seek -the probability that the twins are identical given they have the same gender:
We see that the answer depends on the prior probability that the twins are identical, Pr( =1). The paper x by Amrhein points out that this is a mathematical fact. For example, if identical twins were et al. impossible (Pr( = 1) = 0), then Pr( = 1| = 1) = 0. Similarly, if all twins were identical (Pr( = 1) = 1), then x x y x Pr( = 1| = 1) = 1. The "true" prior lies somewhere in between. Apparently, the doctor knows that one
x y third of twins are identical . Therefore, if we assume Pr( = 1) = 1/3, then Pr( = 1| = 1) = 1/2.
x
x y
Now, what would happen if we didn't have the doctor's knowledge? Laplace's "Principle of Insufficient Reason" would suggest that we give equal prior probability to all possibilities, so Pr( = 1) = 1/2 and Pr( = x x 1| = 1) = 2/3, an answer different from 1/2 that was obtained when using the doctor's prior of 1/3. y highlights this sensitivity to the prior, representing someone who defines an uninformative Efron (2013a) prior as a "violator", with Laplace as the "prime violator". In contrast, Amrhein correctly points out that et al. the difference in the posterior probabilities is merely a consequence of mathematical logic. No one is violating logic -they are merely expressing ignorance by specifying equal probabilities to all states of nature. Whether this is philosophically valid is debatable ( ), but this example does not lend Colyvan 2008 much weight to that question, and it is well beyond the scope of this review. But setting Pr( = 1) = 1/2 is x not a violation; it is merely an assumption with consequences (and one that in hindsight might be incorrect ).
Alternatively, if we don't know Pr( = 1), we could describe that probability by its own probability x distribution. Now the problem has two aspects that are uncertain. We don't know the true state , and we x don't know the prior (except in the case where we use the doctor's knowledge that Pr( = 1) = 1/3).
x Uncertainty in the state of refers to uncertainty about this particular set of twins. In contrast, uncertainty x in Pr( = 1) reflects uncertainty in the population-level frequency of identical twins. A key point is that the x state of one particular set of twins is a different parameter from the frequency of occurrence of identical twins in the population.
Without knowledge about Pr( = 1), we might use Pr( = 1) ~ dunif(0, 1), which is consistent with Laplace.
x x Alternatively, ) notes another alternative for an uninformative prior: Pr( = 1) ~ dbeta(0.5, Efron (2013b x 0.5), which is the Jeffreys prior for a probability.
Here I disagree with Amrhein ; I think they are confusing the two uncertain parameters. Amrhein et al. et al. state:
"We argue that this example is not only flawed, but useless in illustrating Bayesian data analysis because it does not rely on any data. Although there is one data point (a couple is due to be parents of twin boys, and the twins are fraternal), Efron does not use it to update prior knowledge. Instead, Efron combines different pieces of expert knowledge from the doctor and genetics using Bayes' theorem."
This claim might be correct when describing uncertainty in the population-level frequency of identical twins. The data about the twin boys is not useful by itself for this purpose -they are a biased sample (the data have come to light because their gender is the same; they are not a random sample of twins).
Further, a sample of size one, especially if biased, is not a firm basis for inference about a population 2 2 Further, a sample of size one, especially if biased, is not a firm basis for inference about a population parameter. While the data are biased, the claim by Amrheim that there are no data is incorrect. et al.
However, the data point (the twins have the same gender) is entirely relevant to the question about the state of this particular set of twins. And it does update the prior. This updating of the prior is given by equation (1) above. The doctor's prior probability that the twins are identical (1/3) becomes the posterior probability (1/2) when using information that the twins are the same gender. The prior is clearly updated with Pr( = 1| = 1) ≠ Pr( = 1) in all but trivial cases; Amrheim 's statement that I quoted above is
This possible confusion between uncertainty about these twins and uncertainty about the population level frequency of identical twins is further suggested by Amrhein 's statements: et al.
"Second, for the uninformative prior, Efron mentions erroneously that he used a uniform distribution between zero and one, which is clearly different from the value of 0.5 that was used. Third, we find it at least debatable whether a prior can be called an uninformative prior if it has a fixed value of 0.5 given without any measurement of uncertainty."
Note, if the prior for Pr( = 1) is specified as 0.5, or dunif(0,1), or dbeta(0.5, 0.5), the posterior probability
x that these twins are identical is 2/3 in all cases.
says the different priors lead to different Efron (2013b) results, but this result is incorrect, and the correct answer (2/3) is given in . Nevertheless, a Efron (2013a) prior that specifies Pr( = 1) = 0.5 does indicate uncertainty about whether this particular set of twins is
x identical (but certainty in the population level frequency of twins). And result is consistent Efron's (2013a) with Pr( = 1) having a uniform prior. Therefore, both claims in the quote above are incorrect.
It is probably easiest to show the (lack of) influence of the prior using MCMC sampling. Here is WinBUGS code for the case using Pr( = 1) = 0.5. Running this model in WinBUGS shows that the posterior mean of is 2/3; this is the posterior probability x that = 1.
x Instead of using pr_ident_twins <-0.5, we could set this probability as being uncertain and define pr_ident_twins ~ dunif(0,1), or pr_ident_twins ~ dbeta(0.5,0.5). In either case, the posterior mean value of remains 2/3 (contrary to , but in accord with the correction in ). x
Efron 2013b Efron 2013a
Note, however, that the value of the population level parameter pr_ident_twins is different in all three cases. In the first it remains unchanged at 1/2 where it was set. In the case where the prior distribution for cases. In the first it remains unchanged at 1/2 where it was set. In the case where the prior distribution for pr_ident_twins is uniform or beta, the posterior distributions remain broad, but they differ depending on the prior (as they should -different priors lead to different posteriors ). However, given the biased sample size of 1, the posterior distribution for this particular parameter is likely to be misleading as an estimate of the population-level frequency of twins.
So why doesn't the choice of prior influence the posterior probability that these twins are identical? Well, for these three priors, the prior probability that any single set of twins is identical is 1/2 (this is essentially the mean of the prior distributions in these three cases).
If, instead, we set the prior as dbeta (1, 2) , which has a mean of 1/3, then the posterior probability that these twins are identical is 1/2. This is the same result as if we had set Pr( = 1) = 1/3. In both these cases x (choosing dbeta (1, 2) or 1/3), the prior probability that a single set of twins is identical is 1/3, so the posterior is the same (1/2) given the data (the twins have the same gender).
Further, Amrhein also seem to misunderstand the data. They note: et al.
"Although there is one data point (a couple is due to be parents of twin boys, and the twins are fraternal)... " This is incorrect. The parents simply know that the twins are both male. Whether they are fraternal is unknown (fraternal twins being the complement of identical twins) -that is the question the parents are asking. This error of interpretation makes the calculations in Box 1 and subsequent comments irrelevant.
Box 1 also implies Amrhein are using the data to estimate the population frequency of identical twins et al. rather than the state of this particular set of twins. This is different from the aim of and the Efron (2013a) stated question.
Efron suggests that Bayesian calculations should be checked with frequentist methods when priors are uncertain. However, this is a good example where this cannot be done easily, and Amrhein are et al. correct to point this out. In this case, we are interested in the probability that the hypothesis is true given the data (an inverse probability), not the probabilities that the observed data would be generated given particular hypotheses (frequentist probabilities). If one wants the inverse probability (the probability the twins are identical given they are the same gender), then Bayesian methods (and therefore a prior) are required. A logical answer simply requires that the prior is constructed logically. Whether that answer is "correct" will be, in most cases, only known in hindsight.
However, one possible way to analyse this example using frequentist methods would be to assess the likelihood of obtaining the data for each of the two hypothesis (the twins are identical or fraternal). The likelihood of the twins having the same gender under the hypothesis that they are identical is 1. The likelihood of the twins having the same gender under the hypothesis that they are fraternal is 0.5. Therefore, the weight of evidence in favour of identical twins is twice that of fraternal twins. Scaling these weights so they sum to one , gives a weight of 2/3 for identical twins and (Burnham and Anderson 2002) 1/3 for fraternal twins. These scaled weights have the same numerical values as the posterior probabilities based on either a Laplace or Jeffreys prior. Thus, one might argue that the weight of evidence for each hypothesis when using frequentist methods is equivalent to the posterior probabilities derived from an uninformative prior. So, as a final aside in reference to , if we are being "violators" when Efron (2013a) using a uniform prior, are we also being "violators" when using frequentist methods to weigh evidence?
Regardless of the answer to this rhetorical question, "checking" the results with frequentist methods doesn't give any more insight than using uninformative priors (in this case). However, this analysis shows 4 doesn't give any more insight than using uninformative priors (in this case). However, this analysis shows that the question can be analysed using frequentist methods; the single data point is not a problem for this. The claim in Armhein that a frequentist analyis "is impossible because there is only one data et al. point, and frequentist methods generally cannot handle such situations" is not supported by this example.
In summary, the comment by Amrhein raises some interesting points that seem worth discussing, et al. but it makes important errors in analysis and interpretation, and misrepresents the results of Efron
This means the current version should not be approved. (2013a). while our analysis aims at making inference on the frequency of occurrence of identical twins in the larger population of twin boys. Indeed, we did not present a re-analysis of Efron's calculations but instead we used a data point that Efron casually cited, namely that the twin boys turned out to be fraternal. Our aim was to show that a Bayesian data analysis is not the same thing as solving a mathematical equation such as Bayes' theorem. In our manuscript, we now clarified that our approach is different from the calculations provided by Efron. We also shortened the manuscript and removed statements that were criticized by Michael McCarthy. Some other responses to McCarthy: "This claim might be correct when describing uncertainty in the population-level frequency of identical twins. The data about the twin boys is not useful by itself for this purpose -they are a biased sample (the data have come to light because their gender is the same; they are not a random sample of twins)." We agree that the sample would be biased if we were interested in the population of twins. If our population of interest are twin boys, however, the data are not biased. "Further, a sample of size one, especially if biased, is not a firm basis for inference about a population parameter." We agree this would be a low sample size if this were an empirical study. We only used the data point to illustrate how to update the knowledge about the probability of identical twins among twin boys. "Note, if the prior for Pr(x = 1) is specified as 0.5, or dunif(0,1), or dbeta(0.5, 0.5), the posterior probability that these twins are identical is 2/3 in all cases." In our view, the fixed posterior probability of 2/3 applies only to the prior specified as a fixed value of 0.5, while the other two prior distributions each produce posterior distributions of different shape. We thus would not agree to the notion that the posterior probabilities are identical in all cases (but we deleted the respective paragraph from our paper).
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